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We extend our previous research by determining whether, and how, the impact of managed care on
substance abuse treatment (SAT) services differs by facility ownership. 
We use the 2000 National Survey of Substance Abuse Treatment Services that contains data on
service offerings and other characteristics of 10,513 SAT facilities. For each group of for-profit, not-
for-profit, and public facilities, we estimate the impact of managed care (MC) on the number and
types of SAT services offered (i.e., indicators of the quality of care). We use IVs to account for
possible endogeneity between facilities' involvement in MC and service offerings. 
We find substantial differences in the magnitude and direction of the impact of MC by facility
ownership. On average, MC causes for-profits to offer approximately four (out of 26) additional
services, causes publics to offer approximately four fewer services, and has no impact on the number
of services offered by not-for-profits. 
Our findings raise concerns that managed care may reduce the quality of care provided by public
SAT facilities by limiting the range of services offered. On the other hand, for-profit clinics are
found to increase their range of services; the societal impact of this is unclear for several reasons.
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INTRODUCTION 
This paper extends our previous research by determining whether, and how, the impact of 
managed care on service offerings varies by the profit status of the substance abuse treatment 
facility.  It adds to the literature on the impact of profit status on the provision of health care and 
extends this literature to the relatively less studied area of substance abuse treatment.  This topic 
is important for several reasons.  Substance abuse is an important and costly problem, harming 
abusers as well as their families, friends, and society (ONDCP 2001, Harwood, Fountain and 
Livermore 1998).  Effective treatment can reduce many of these costs (IOM 1990, ONDCP 
1996, National Consensus Development Panel on Effective Medical Treatment of Opiate 
Addition 1998, NIDA 1999).  In addition, managed care (MC) has been growing rapidly in the 
substance abuse treatment (SAT) field, and there is some concern that MC’s emphasis on cost-
containment may result in fewer services offered, thus reducing treatment effectiveness 
(Olmstead, White and Sindelar 2004, Alexander, Lemak and Campbell 2003).  Reduced 
effectiveness, in turn, could have a negative impact on society through increases in crime, 
welfare dependency, and spread of infectious diseases. 
Substance abuse treatment is provided by a mix of for-profit (FP), not-for-profit (NFP), 
and public providers. The majority of the providers in the SAT market are NFPs and the fewest 
number are publics.  However, publics tend to be larger in terms of people treated per clinic. 
Characteristics of SAT facilities vary systematically by ownership type for several reasons, 
including differences in mission, client mix, and opportunities and constraints imposed by their 
profit status. For-profits, for example, tend to serve clients who have relatively fewer 
comorbidities and are privately insured or able to pay for care out-of-pocket, while publics tend 
to treat clients who have relatively more comorbidities and whose care is supported by   4 
government financing (Rodgers and Barnett 2000, Wheeler and Nahra 2000, Ettner et al. 2003).  
These differences suggest that the impact of managed care may vary by profit status. 
This paper focuses on how managed care differentially affects the range of services 
offered by providers with different ownership types.  Range of services is a key measure of 
treatment effectiveness (Olmstead, White and Sindelar 2004). Treatment effectiveness is 
improved by the availability of a range of services, including social and medical services, 
necessary to meet the wide spectrum of needs faced by drug-dependent individuals (McLellan et 
al. 1993, Milby et al. 1996, McLellan et al. 1998, McLellan et al. 1999, Gould, Levine and 
McLellan 2000, Marsh, D’Aunno and Smith 2000, Smith and Marsh 2002).  While there is a 
growing interest in the effects of MC on SAT generally, relatively few studies have focused on 
the effects of MC on the number and type of SAT services offered, and none of these examine 
whether and by how much the effect varies by the ownership type of the provider.  
This study presents empirical evidence on these issues.   Data from more than 10,000 
SAT facilities in the US are used in these analyses.  We use the instrumental variables approach 
to identify the effects of MC on SAT service offerings, thus going beyond pure association, as is 
common in this literature, to causal effects.  We examine the offerings of twenty-six different 
services. Because our data comprise virtually the universe of SAT facilities, our statistical power 
is high and our results are nationally generalizable.  Our findings should be of interest to policy 
makers, researchers, patients, public and private payers, clinics and clinicians. 
RELEVANT SAT LITERATURE 
A substantial body of literature addresses differences across firms by profit status 
generally (Hansman 1980, Weisbrod 1988, Kapur and Weisbrod 2002, and for a summary see 
Steinberg 2004).  The health care delivery system, in particular, is characterized by a mix of   5 
NFPs, FPs, and publics in a market. With this interesting mix of ownership types, there have 
been substantial analyses of differences by profit status for various types of health care markets, 
e.g. hospitals (see Newhouse 1970 for a classic), nursing homes (Hirth 1999), and hospice 
(Lindrooth and Weisbrod 2004, Carlson, Gallo and Bradley 2004).  However, there has been 
relatively less analysis of the impact of profit status in the SAT delivery system.  We discuss first 
literature on facility ownership in the SAT market and then briefly review literature on MC in 
SAT. 
Facility ownership 
Research has shown that the profit status of SAT facilities is associated with differences 
in clientele, access to care, and services offered. Considerable research has shown evidence of a 
two-tiered substance abuse treatment system in which FPs cater to and serve clients that are 
typically privately insured (or able to pay for care out-of-pocket) and have relatively fewer 
comorbidities, while publics tend to treat clients whose care is supported by government 
financing and who have relatively more comorbidities (Rodgers and Barnett 2000, Wheeler and 
Nahra 2000, Ettner et al. 2003). 
The relationship between facility ownership and the SAT delivery system has been 
examined in a number of studies.  Friedmann et al. (2003) find that, compared to publics, FPs are 
twice as likely to provide “treatment on demand” (wait time of 48 hours or less for treatment 
entry), but seven times more likely to turn patients away (presumably because of their inability to 
pay).  Alexander, Nahra, and Wheeler (2003) find that publics and NFPs are more likely than 
FPs both to treat a larger percentage of clients who are unable to pay and to offer clients reduced 
fees for services rendered.  In addition, they find that publics and NFPs are less likely than FPs to 
shorten treatment periods for their clients because of inability to pay.   6 
Several studies have shown that FPs are significantly less likely than publics to offer 
comprehensive services, possibly because FP clientele have less need for these services 
(Olmstead and Sindelar 2004, Friedmann et al. 2003, Friedmann, Alexander, and D’Aunno 1999, 
Lee et al 2001).  For example, in a recent study, Friedmann et al. (2003) find that FPs are 
significantly less likely than publics to offer employment counseling, mental health care, routine 
medical care, and physical examinations.  In an earlier study, Friedmann, Alexander, and 
D’Aunno (1999) found that FPs were less likely than publics to provide TB treatment, 
HIV/AIDS treatment, and mental health services. 
Managed care 
Many studies have found that MC in behavioral health markets is associated with a move 
away from high-cost inpatient care to less-costly outpatient venues (Ettner et al. 2003, Ettner et 
al. 2003, Sturm 2000, Steenrod et al. 2001, Frank and McGuire 1997).  Lemak and Alexander 
(2001) find that treatment intensity (months in treatment and number of therapy sessions 
involved) is negatively affected by the stringency of MC (average number of visits per patient 
authorized by MC), but unaffected by the scope of MC (number of different MC oversight 
activities).  In contrast, Ettner et al. (2003) find that MC is associated with longer treatment 
episodes, more visits per episode, and better outcomes. 
Alexander, Nahra, and Wheeler (2003) find that outpatient substance abuse treatment 
(OSAT) units with either relatively low or high MC penetration are more likely to support access 
to care by: (1) providing care to a higher percentage of clients unable to pay, and (2) being less 
likely to shorten treatment because of client inability to pay (OSAT units with midrange MC 
penetration were least likely to support access to care).  And Friedmann et al. (2003) find that   7 
MC involvement increases the likelihood of both treatment on demand and turning patients 
away.   
D’Ambrosio et al. (2003) and Alexander and Lemak (1997) both find that MC is 
associated with increased administrative costs to the provider.  Alexander, Lemak, and Campbell 
(2003) find that MC activity has increased among SAT providers affiliated with hospitals and 
mental health centers (perhaps reflecting a desire on the part of MC organizations to purchase a 
more comprehensive array of services from the same provider). 
Several studies focus on the relationship between MC and the number or type of services 
offered at SAT facilities.  Friedmann et al. (2003) find that MC is associated with greater 
availability of mental health services and routine medical care (but not financial counseling, 
employment counseling, or physical exams).  Durkin (2002) finds that MC is associated with a 
reduction in the likelihood of providing employment counseling and financial counseling, and an 
increase in the likelihood of providing routine medical care and physical exams.  Olmstead, 
White, and Sindelar (2004) examine a broad array of 26 SAT services and find that: (1) MC 
causes SAT facilities to offer, on average, approximately two fewer services overall, and (2) this 
effect is concentrated primarily in tests for infectious diseases (i.e., TB, HIV/AIDs, and STDs).   
Finally, McNeese-Smith (1998) reports that 38% of surveyed SAT program directors in 
LA County eliminated some services in response to MC, and Rivers (1998) reports that 20% of 
surveyed SAT program directors in Miami-Dade County claimed that MC caused reduced 
availability and accessibility of SAT services.   8 
CONCEPTUAL  FRAMEWORK 
          We provide a brief conceptual framework for examining how the impact of MC on SAT 
service offerings may vary by facility ownership.  We draw on several lines of research which 
together suggest how the impact of managed care may vary by the profit status of the facility.  
Organizational type in SAT    
Theories of why a mixture of ownership types exists in some industries and not others are 
largely based on market failures, government failures, and voluntary failures (for a summary see 
Steinberg, 2004).  In health care, NFPs and publics are likely to develop due to their charitable 
goals.  In the case of SAT, they may also arise due to the market failure associated with negative 
externalities from substance abuse.  That is, addiction to illicit drugs often produces negative 
externalities (e.g. crime and spread of disease), thus society should be interested in obtaining 
effective treatment for drug users. 
         Providers of different ownership types will have systematically varying goals, opportunities 
and constraints based on their profit status.  These differences can in turn produce differences in 
client mix, pricing, funding, access to care, range of services offered and behavioral response to 
MC.  
         For-profit firms have the goal that is clearest to articulate, they desire to maximize profits 
for their owners and investors.  Thus, for-profit SAT organizations typically are more concerned 
with efficiency. They may want to attract those clients who will be most profitable for the 
organization, that is, those who have a favorable combination of relatively low treatment cost but 
high fees paid.  FPs may attract these most desirable clients by providing high quality at a price 
prohibitively high for those of low income or those with less generous insurance coverage.  FPs   9 
have financial advantages in that they can raise private equity and have fewer constraints on their 
property rights and transactions (e.g., they can pay managers incentives based on profits).   
   Not-for-profits’ goals are less easily summarized. They may have the goal of “doing 
good,” possibly reflecting the mission of the board, founders or parent organization.  Potential 
donors to these NFPs presumably will have goals compatible with the organization, and they will 
want to ensure that donations will be used for these causes (rather than be diverted to private 
gain).  Due to their goal of serving communities, NFPs generally are exempt from federal, state, 
and local taxes on income, property, and purchases.  Although NFPs do not have access to equity 
capital (as do FPs) or to tax revenues (as do publics), they have access to tax-exempt bonds, 
subsidized loans, and financial contributions that are tax-deductible to the giver (Gray and 
McNerney 1986, Rosenau and Linder 2003). NFPs are subject to a non-distribution constraint, 
which restricts the right to pay out organization profit to managers or directors. 
Public organizations have broad social goals and are often characterized as the “supplier 
of last resort” due to their concern with making services available to all individuals, regardless of 
their ability to pay (Kapur and Weisbrod 2000, Ballou and Weisbrod 2003, Hodgkin et al. 2004).  
Public providers of SAT may have as their mission to treat the most needy and to treat as many 
of those in need as the budget will allow.  The revenue of publics is based largely on the political 
budgeting process whereby tax revenues are allocated at the federal and state level (Kapur and 
Weisbrod 2000, Ballou and Weisbrod 2003).  Publics are also subject to a non-distribution 
constraint. 
Thus, differences in profit status related to differences in constraints and opportunities are 
likely to lead to differences in goals, behavior, client mix and organizational responses to MC.             10 
  Managed care contracting 
          If a provider has a MC contract in place, this implies that both the managed care 
organization (MCO) and the treatment facility came to terms on the MCO’s requirements. The 
SAT facility had to have agreed to the prices offered and other terms (including UR, reporting, 
etc.) of the MC contract. The decision to agree to the MC contract on the part of a provider 
would be a function of the characteristics of the facility, including current services offered, 
current price, and administrative ability to meet reporting and service requirements (Olmstead, 
White and Sindelar 2004).  Viewed from the other side, the MC organization will want to 
contract with a treatment facility that either already offers, or is willing to offer the quality and 
services that are required by the MC organization and is also willing and able to accept the price, 
UR, and reporting requirements.  
         In some cases, MC may not have any impact on services or price, as the facility either 
already offers the required mix (a simple matching),
1 or may have the market power to resist 
changes.  In other cases, MC’s pricing and administrative controls may lead to changes in price, 
quality, services offered, costs, reporting requirements and other.  
         However, because payment for SAT is made on a per diem or weekly basis, and is typically 
independent of services offered, the MCO could readily impact the range of services offered.  
Core services are counseling and urine toxicology.  MC may require these services but not be 
willing to pay for extensive services much beyond core requirements, e.g. medical testing for 
disease or transportation assistance. The overall impact of MC may be to standardize treatment, 
increase assessments for UR, and possibly reduce overall treatment quality if prices of MC are 
                                                 
1 For discussions on selective contracting, see Lemak, Alexander, and D’Aunno (2001), Alexander, Nahra and 
Wheeler (2003), and Alexander, Lemak and Campbell (2003).   11 
lower than the current prices accepted  (Dranove and Satterthwaite 2000, Dranove, Satterthwaite 
and Sindelar 1986, Glazer and McGuire 2002). 
Differential impact of MC 
 MC may operate in very different settings across ownership types due to differences in 
mission, client mix, regulatory constraints, and facility financing.  These differences may 
mitigate or exacerbate the impact of MC on service offerings.  One implication of this is that 
facilities should be analyzed allowing for a differential response by ownership type. Facilities 
that had relatively few services prior to MC may add services required by the MCO (e.g. types of 
UR).  Facilities that are offered a lower price by MC may reduce service offerings beyond core 
services.  MC may be unwilling to reimburse for services it deems either cost-ineffective or not 
“medically necessary” for treating substance abuse (e.g., ancillary services such as employment 
counseling, transportation assistance and testing for diseases). 
Public facilities tend to treat clients that have relatively more problems (including social, 
economic, and health-related) and offer, on average, a wider range of SAT services than do for-
profit facilities (Olmstead, White, and Sindelar 2004, Friedmann et al. 2003, Lee et al. 2001, 
Friedmann, Alexander and D’Aunno 1999).  Publics also tend to see themselves as the “supplier 
of last resort” (Hodgkin et al. 2004, Ballou and Weisbrod 2003, Kapur and Weisbrod 2000).  
And public facilities have more governmental financing, specifically block grants that provide a 
lump sum to the facility and expect a large number of clients to be treated (Wheeler and Nahra 
2000, Rodgers and Barnett 2000).  Although it is possible that MC would cause publics to offer 
an even wider range of services—say, by requiring more types of assessments—we expect that 
MC will cause publics to narrow their range of services for the following reasons.  First, MC 
may not reimburse for services that are either cost-ineffective, not “necessary” for substance   12 
abuse treatment (e.g., transportation assistance, child care), or covered by another part of the 
health plan (e.g., medical services such as TB testing).  Second, MC may reduce overall 
reimbursement levels for offered services such that publics must offset lost revenues by 
eliminating “noncore” services (e.g., ancillary social and medical services) 
Private for-profit facilities have tended to offer the fewest services and tend to serve 
clients who are privately insured (or able to pay for care out-of-pocket) and have relatively fewer 
comorbidities. Thus MC might result in more services offered at FPs as the “quality of care” 
(here measured as number of services offered) is standardized across providers. Additional 
assessments might be required for UR, for example.  Services offered might also increase with 
MC if there is a shift by private pay patients from inpatient facilities to outpatient facilities; more 
intensive services may be required for those who would otherwise be treated on an inpatient 
basis.  The net impact of MC might be to encourage FPs to seek out new types of clients to make 
more efficient use of excess capacity.
2  On the other hand, MC could have no effect if it is just a 
matching process, with FPs being most able to provide the reporting required by MC. 
Given that NFPs are a hybrid of FPs and publics, it is difficult to predict the effect of MC 
on the range of services offered by NFPs.  A reasonable conjecture is that the effect of MC on 
NFPs will lie somewhere between its effect on FPs and publics.  Thus, the net impact is an 
empirical issue, one which we address. 
                                                 
2 FPs typically have excess capacity, as compared to publics that typically operate at or over-capacity.  Being profit-
maximizers, FPs should already be offering the optimal mix of services for their targeted client base.  However, if 
revenues are reduced by MC, FPs may need to cover fixed costs by expanding their customer base to serve clients 
that offer a lower rate of return than previously considered acceptable.  These new clients, in turn, will likely require 
additional services (not currently offered) to be attracted to the FPs.   13 
METHODS 
Data 
Data on SAT facilities were obtained from the 2000 National Survey of Substance Abuse 
Treatment Services (NSSATS), a national survey administered by the Substance Abuse and 
Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) that collects information on the location, 
characteristics, and use of SAT facilities and services in the US (USDHHS 2002b).  The list 
frame for the 2000 NSSATS is the Inventory of Substance Abuse Treatment Services (I-SATS), 
a continuously-updated census of all known SAT facilities, both public and private, throughout 
the US and its territories.  Analyses were performed separately for facilities with public 
ownership, private for-profit ownership, and private not-for-profit ownership. 
Of the original census of 14,622 SAT facilities deemed eligible for the survey, 13,749 (94 
percent) completed the survey.
3  Of these, we exclude facilities located in other US jurisdictions 
(n = 120),
4 owned by federal or tribal governments (n = 481), or offering detoxification services 
only (n = 41).  An additional 2,594 facilities are excluded due to missing data, resulting in a final 
study sample comprising 10,513 SAT facilities.
5   
We supplement the 2000 NSSATS data on facility characteristics with county-specific 
data from the 2002 Area Resource File (USDHHS 2002a), a database containing information on 
population and managed care activity in the US.
6 
                                                 
3 Facilities were deemed ineligible for the survey if they were not providing substance abuse treatment as of October 
1, 2002 or treated incarcerated clients only. 
4 Other US jurisdictions include the territories of American Samoa and Guam, the Federated States of Micronesia, 
the Republic of Palau, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. 
5 Facilities are not missing data in a systematic fashion, so we do not expect any bias due to missing data. 
6 The 2002 Area Resource File uses the InterStudy County Surveyor Database for the number of HMO enrollees in 
each county.   14 
 Outcomes 
The 2000 NSSATS records whether a facility offers each of twenty-six different SAT 
services.  Accordingly, we use twenty-seven outcome variables to measure service offerings at a 
facility.  The first outcome variable is the total number of services offered at the facility (ranging 
from 1 to 26), while the remaining twenty-six outcome variables are binary indicators, each one 
corresponding to the presence of a specific service at the facility.  NSSATS groups the twenty-
six individual services into five categories: assessment, therapy/counseling, medical testing, 
transitional, and other services.  Table 1 lists each of the outcome variables used in this study.  
  Table 1: Summary Statistics of Outcome Variables 
Regressors  
We control for a wide variety of important facility and county-specific characteristics.  
Facility characteristics include the presence of managed care, focus, setting, modality, 
accreditation, licensure, size, types of payment accepted, and willingness to offer payment 
assistance.  Our measure of managed care is whether or not the facility has a relationship with a 
managed care organization, MC, set to 1 if a facility has at least one agreement or contract with a 
managed care organization to provide substance abuse treatment services, and 0 otherwise.  
Facility foci include substance abuse, mental health, general health, mixed mental health and 
substance abuse, and other.  Settings include hospital, solo practice, and halfway house.  
Modalities include hospital inpatient, non-hospital residential, outpatient, and 
methadone/LAAM.  Finally, types of payment accepted include cash, private health insurance, 
Medicaid, Medicare, state-financed health insurance, and public funds (not including Medicaid 
and Medicare).   15 
County-specific characteristics include population size, population density (people per 
square mile), metropolitan area, competition among facilities (measured using Herfindahl 
indices), and managed care activity (measured using the number of Medicare managed care and 
HMO enrollees in the county). Table 2 lists each of the regressors used in this study. We control 
for these variables based on earlier studies and the conceptual framework. 
  Table 2: Summary Statistics of Regressors 
Estimation 
We first present descriptive data by facility ownership type (i.e., publics, FPs, and NFPs).  
Facilities are further subdivided by the presence of managed care.  Proportions are given for 
categorical variables and means for continuous variables.  By comparing the characteristics of 
facilities with and without MC, we can get a sense of whether differential selection of facilities 
into relationships with MC is likely to confound the relationship between MC and service 
offerings.     
We then use a two-equation instrumental variables (IV) approach to estimate the effect of 
MC on the outcome variables.  This approach allows us to account for possible endogeneity 
between a facility’s involvement in MC and service offerings.  Endogeneity would be present, 
for example, if managed care is attracted to facilities with an unobserved (to the analyst) 
propensity to offer more (or fewer) services. For example, MC may be attracted to facilities with 
administrative sophistication, a trait which is unobserved to the researcher but correlated with 
both service offerings and MC.  With valid instruments, the IV approach accounts for 
endogeneity and produces consistent estimates of the causal effect of managed care on service 
offerings (Davidson and MacKinnon 1993).  The IV approach is used frequently in economic   16 
applications and is becoming increasingly common in healthcare evaluations (McClellan and 
Newhouse 2000).   
We use the following 2-equation model: 
(1)  Y = bX + gMC + e 
(2)   MC = aX + kZ + m 
where Y is the outcome variable under study (i.e., either total number of services at the facility or 
presence of a specific service at the facility), MC is a dummy variable indicating the presence of 
managed care at the facility, X is a vector of facility and environmental characteristics, e is the 
error term for equation (1) that captures unobserved determinants of Y, Z is a vector of 
instruments that influence the presence of managed care but are uncorrelated with e, and m is the 
error term for equation (2). 
When the outcome variable in (1) is total number of services, the two-equation system is 
estimated using a full-maximum-likelihood ‘treatment effects’ model (Maddala 1983) that 
considers the effect of an endogenously chosen binary treatment (managed care) on another 
endogenous, fully-observed, continuous variable (number of offered services).  When the 
outcome variable in (1) is the presence of a specific service (a binary indicator), the two-equation 
system is estimated using a maximum likelihood bivariate probit model (Maddala 1983).  In both 
models, facilities are clustered by county to account for possible spatial correlation amongst 
facilities operating in the same geographic area. 
We estimate separate models for each group of facilities (publics, FPs, and NFPs).  
Specifically, we estimate a treatment effects model for the total number of services and twenty-
six separate bivariate probit models, one for each of the twenty-six specific services.  The same 
explanatory variables are used across the different ownership types. By estimating separate   17 
regressions for each profit status, we allow the coefficients on all the independent variables to 
differ by ownership type.  Tables are presented giving the “predictive margins.”
7   
The IV approach requires finding one or more variables to be used as instruments, Z, that 
substantially affect MC but have no direct impact on Y.  We use two different county-specific 
instruments in our model: number of Medicare MC enrollees and number of HMO enrollees. 
Given that we control for county population and density, the number of Medicare MC (or HMO) 
enrollees is, in essence, a percentage.  
Both instruments plausibly satisfy the first correlation condition inasmuch as SAT 
facilities in counties with a large number (“percentage”) of Medicare MC (or HMO) enrollees 
are more likely to have agreements or contracts with managed care than their counterparts in 
counties with relatively few Medicare MC (or HMO) enrollees.  Similar county-specific 
environmental factors (e.g., local tastes, state/local laws, demographics) could cause this 
correlation.  Spillover effects of many kinds could increase the favorable climate for managed 
care in SAT.  As for the second condition, it seems plausible that the number of Medicare MC 
enrollees in a given county is unlikely to directly influence the service-offering decisions at SAT 
facilities in that county.  Medicare covers primarily those 65 or older and SAT facilities treat 
very few elderly (approximately 1.5% of SAT clients are 65 or older). Similarly, there is likely to 
be relatively little overlap between HMO enrollees and SAT clients (about 11 percent of the total 
population in the US is drug dependent and only a fraction of them seek substance abuse 
treatment).  
We assess formally the validity of our instruments by testing for the presence of bias due 
to weak instruments and conducting a standard test of overidentification. 
                                                 
7 Predictive margins measure the difference in the expected value of the outcome when the MC indicator is changed 
from 0 to 1 and all other regressors are held constant at their original values.   18 
RESULTS 
Descriptive data by facility ownership 
Table 1 shows that, for each ownership type, MC is associated with more total services 
and an increased likelihood of offering most of the specific services.  For example, MC is 
associated with 2.2 more services in FPs, 1.2 more services in NFPs, and 1.0 more services in 
publics.  However, as shown in Table 2, facilities with and without MC differ systematically in 
other important ways as well.  For each ownership type, for example, facilities with MC 
contracts are more likely to be larger, affiliated with a hospital, accredited, and to focus on both 
substance abuse and mental health.  These factors could be associated with the availability of 
more services, thereby explaining the positive association between MC and services.   Thus, we 
need to control for relevant covariates when estimating the impact of MC on service offerings.  
Moreover, MC is likely to be endogenously determined.  That is, there may be unobserved 
factors that affect both the availability of services and the presence of MC.  We now turn to the 
IV models. 
IV specification controlling for facility characteristics 
(a) Number of services 
When we control for observed covariates and use instrumental variables to account for 
possible endogeneity, the impact of MC on total services varies in magnitude and direction by 
facility ownership.  Table 3 shows that, on average, MC significantly widens the range of 
services offered at FPs by 3.8 services, has no significant impact on the total number of services 
offered at NFPs, and significantly narrows the range of services offered at publics by 3.7 
services.  These findings are quite different from the associations portrayed in the raw data in 
Table 1.       19 
Tables 3 and 3A: IV Models: Total Services – By Ownership 
F-statistics for both the FP and NFP specifications are above 10.0, indicating that there is 
unlikely to be any bias due to weak instruments in these models (Staiger and Stock 1997).  
Although there may be some bias due to weak instruments in the model for publics, this bias is 
probably small inasmuch as the corresponding F-statistic is statistically significant and much 
larger than 1.0 (Bound, Jaeger and Baker 1995).  Importantly, all three models pass the standard 
test of over-identification (Davidson and MacKinnon 1993, Kennedy 1998, Greene 2003), 
adding reassurance that equation (1) is specified correctly and that both instruments are valid.
8  
(b) Specific services 
Table 4 displays the results for the IV models corresponding to specific services offered 
by each ownership type.  We report only the coefficients of MC and suppress the coefficients on 
the control variables to focus on the key results. 
Table 4: Coefficients on Managed Care for Specific Services – By Ownership 
The differential impact of MC on the total number of services offered by FPs and publics 
appears to be concentrated primarily in ancillary service offerings.  That is, MC significantly 
increases the likelihood that FPs offer ancillary services such as discharge planning, housing 
assistance, transportation assistance, and referrals to other transitional services.  In contrast, MC 
significantly decreases the likelihood that publics offer ancillary services such as tests for 
medical diseases (HIV, TB), HIV/AIDs education, employment training, child care, and referrals 
to other transitional services. 
                                                 
8 The test statistic is calculated as N times the uncentered R
2 from regressing the IV residuals on all the instruments, 
and is distributed as a chi-square with degrees of freedom equal to the number of instruments in excess of the 
number of explanatory variables.   
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The effect of MC on specific services offered by NFPs is mixed.  On one hand, MC 
significantly increases the likelihood that NFPs offer substance abuse assessment (though the 
effect is very small), urine screens, relapse prevention groups and discharge planning.  On the 
other hand, MC significantly decreases the likelihood that NFPs offer outcome follow-up, 
employment training, and tests for medical diseases (STDs, TB). 
MC does not appear to have a differential impact across ownership types on assessment, 
therapy, or counseling services.  Although MC significantly impacts the likelihood of offering 
several of these types of services in certain cases, there is no systematic pattern by ownership 
type.  This is not surprising, however, given that these services form the necessary core of SAT 
and so are offered by the vast majority of facilities regardless of ownership type or the presence 
of MC. 
DISCUSSION 
One possible explanation for the differential impact of MC across facility ownership 
types is that MC results in standardization across facilities of different profit status.  That is, in 
the absence of MC, we observe that FPs offer the narrowest range of services, publics the widest, 
and NFPs fall in the middle.  MC could be a standardizing force making the service offerings 
more similar across ownership types. Thus, for-profits add services while publics reduce them. 
Another possible explanation stems from the purported existence of a two-tiered 
substance abuse treatment system, in which FPs typically serve “tier 1” clients while publics tend 
to treat “tier 2” clients.  Public facilities may respond to cuts in reimbursements by eliminating 
“non-essential” ancillary services (e.g., employment training, HIV/AIDs education) with the goal 
of being able to continue to treat large numbers of the needy.
9  In contrast, FP facilities might 
                                                 
9 This explanation is consistent with the “supplier of last resort” model of public healthcare organizations.     21 
respond to revenue cuts by attracting those “tier 2” clients who may now be financially appealing 
to them.
10  FPs would need to offer additional services to attract these “tier 2” clients. 
There are other possible explanations as well. For example, it may be that public and 
private SAT facilities have contracts with different types of MC organizations, which in turn 
may have different goals. For example, managed care associated with state funding (e.g. block 
grants) may want to reduce the range of services offered in order to treat as many people as 
possible with limited funds.  In contrast, private health insurance may have quality of care as a 
more important goal, and may therefore require additional types of treatment to increase 
effectiveness and offset other medical expenses.   
The move from inpatient to outpatient care associated with MC may also differentially 
impact facilities. If, for example, FPs treat more clients who, in the absence of MC, would be in 
inpatient care, then their client base would need a broader range of services in the presence of 
MC.  Note that FPs may be more likely to treat those who otherwise would have been in 
inpatient care because their client base tends to have more generous coverage (which, in turn, 
may be more likely to cover inpatient care but for MC controls).  
Empirically identifying which of the above reasons best explains the observed differential 
impacts, however, is beyond the capability of our data and is also beyond the scope of our paper.  
The finding that MC significantly decreases ancillary service offerings at public SAT 
facilities is consistent with the view that MC reduces payments to the provider and encourages 
core services at the expense of ancillary (wraparound) services. This is also consistent with 
Kapur and Weisbrod (2004) and Hodgkin et al. (2004), both of whom found that public 
healthcare organizations respond to funding cuts by reducing quality of care, as opposed to 
                                                 
10 Being profit-maximizers, FPs should already be offering the optimal mix of services for their targeted client base.  
However, if revenues are reduced by MC, FPs may need to cover their fixed costs in the short run by expanding 
their customer base to serve clients that offer a lower rate of return than previously considered acceptable.   22 
turning away clients (i.e., publics view themselves as the “supplier of last resort”).
11  It also 
supports Alexander, Lemak, and Campbell’s (2003) speculation that as MC expands into the 
public SAT sector, cost containment may reduce the range and type of services available to 
vulnerable populations. 
That MC significantly increases ancillary service offerings at for-profit SAT facilities 
stands somewhat in contrast to Durkin (2002) and Friedmann et al. (2003).  Durkin (2002) found 
that MC is associated with a reduction in the likelihood of providing employment counseling and 
financial counseling, but an increase in the likelihood of providing routine medical care and 
physical exams. Friedmann et al. (2003) found that MC is associated with greater availability of 
mental health services and routine medical care, but not financial counseling, employment 
counseling, or physical exams.  However, since both of these studies use a one-equation logistic 
model that does not account for the endogeneity between MC and service offerings, these results 
may be biased. 
This study is subject to a number of limitations.  First, NSSATS records managed care as 
a binary variable.  Thus, we do not know the intensity, strength, or types of MC mechanisms at 
each facility.  Second, we know only if a service is offered—we do not know whether the service 
has been received, who receives it, nor the intensity nor quality of the service.  It is important to 
recognize, however, that using binary indicators of specific services and MC is a conservative 
approach.  That is, the relatively blunt nature of binary variables could bias against finding 
significant results.  Third, NSSATS does not collect data on client characteristics.  Thus, we 
                                                 
11 We consider the range of service offerings to be one component in the quality of care.  Research shows that a 
greater range of services increases the effectiveness of care (NIDA 1999, McLellan et al. 1998, McLellan et al. 
1999).  Payment to a SAT facility is not, however, typically explicitly determined by the number or range of 
services offered, but rather payment is made on a per diem or weekly basis.  Thus, the range of services may be 
more akin to higher amenities or quality of care that are not paid for directly. 
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cannot test how much, if any, of the total differential impact of MC on FPs and publics is due to 
a “two-tiered” SAT system, as speculated above, or to other factors (e.g., standardization).  
Indeed, this is an important area for future research.  Finally, there may be some bias in the 
results for publics due to weak instruments.  However, we expect this bias to be small given that 
the corresponding F-statistic (in Table 3) is both significant and much larger than 1.0 (Bound, 
Jaeger and Baker 1995).   
Although we recognize that the aforementioned NSSATS data limitations constrain our 
analyses, offsetting these limitations is the fact that we use almost the entire universe of SAT 
facilities in our study, including data on a wide range of specific service offerings.  Thus, our 
statistical power is high and our results are nationally generalizable. Further, although we have 
only a crude measure of MC, we are able to move the literature forward by discovering the 
interesting differential impacts of MC by provider profit status. This adds to both the SAT and 
ownership type literatures. Although we cannot identify with certainty the specific mechanisms 
underlying the observed differential impacts, we pave the way for future research to study such 
mechanisms. 
CONCLUSIONS 
This study shows that the impact of MC on SAT service offerings depends on facility 
ownership.  Specifically, MC significantly increases the number of services offered at private 
for-profits, has no significant effect on the number of services offered at private not-for-profits, 
and significantly decreases the number of services offered at public SAT facilities.  Moreover, it 
appears that the differential impact of MC across ownership types is concentrated in ancillary 
service offerings (e.g., tests for medical diseases, employment training, housing assistance, child 
care, referrals to other transitional services).  Our findings can be interpreted as causal, subject to   24 
the above limitations, because they are derived from IV models that not only control for relevant 
covariates but also adjust for potential endogeneity between MC and service offerings.  The 
study adds to the existing SAT literature by demonstrating that the impact of MC on SAT service 
offerings differs in magnitude and direction by facility ownership, and by quantifying these 
differential impacts. The study also adds to the empirical literature on mixed profit status 
industries by extending the analyses to SAT.    
Our findings raise policy concerns because a reduced range of ancillary service offerings 
in public facilities could result in unmet needs for SAT clients in these facilities. This, in turn, 
could lead to worse treatment outcomes for those in SAT as well as an increase in the negative 
externalities associated with drug abuse (e.g., unemployment, crime, spread of infectious 
diseases).  However, the impact on society of the increase in the range of services offered by FPs 
is unclear.  If, for example, FPs are attracting clients who would not otherwise have received 
treatment elsewhere, then the effect of MC is beneficial to both the clients and society.  On the 
other hand, if FPs are cream-skimming the “healthier and wealthier” tier-2 clients from NFP and 
public facilities, then this would leave NFPs and publics with a client base that is less able to pay 
for services, possibly forcing these facilities to cut service offerings more than would otherwise 







   25 
REFERENCES 
Alexander, J., and C. Lemak. 1997. “The Effects of Managed Care on Administrative Burden in 
Outpatient Substance Abuse Treatment Units.” Medical Care 35 (5):1060-8. 
 
Alexander, J., C. Lemak, and C. Campbell. 2003. “Changes in Managed Care Activity in 
Outpatient Substance Abuse Treatment Organizations, 1995-2000.”  Journal of 
Behavioral Health Sciences and Research 30 (4):369-81. 
 
Alexander, J., T. Nahra, and J. Wheeler. 2003. “Managed Care and Access to Substance Abuse 
Treatment Services.” Journal of Behavioral Health Services and Research 30 (2):161-75. 
 
Ballou, J., and B. Weisbrod. 2003. “Managerial Rewards and the Behavior of For-Profit, 
Governmental, and Nonprofit Organizations: Evidence from the Hospital Industry.” 
Journal of Public Economics 87 (9-10):1895-20. 
 
Bound, J., D. Jaeger, and R. Baker. 1995. “Problems with Instrumental Variables Estimation 
When the Correlation Between the Instruments and the Endogenous Explanatory 
Variable is Weak.” Journal of the American Statistical Association 90 (430):443-50. 
 
Carlson, M., W. Gallo, and E. Bradley. 2004. “Ownership Status and Patterns of Care in Hospice 
– Results from the National Home and Hospice Care Survey.” Medical Care 42 (5):432-
8. 
 
D’Ambrosio, R., F. Mondeaux, R. Gabriel, and K. Laws. 2003. “Oregon’s Transition to a 
Managed Care Model for Medicaid-Funded Substance Abuse Treatment: Steamrolling 
the Glass Menagerie.” Health and Social Work 28 (2) 126-36. 
 
Davidson, R., and J. MacKinnon. 1993. Estimation and Inference in Econometrics. New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
 
Dranove, D., and M. Satterthwaite. 2000. “The Industrial Organization of Health Care Markets.” 
In Handbook of Health Economics, vol. 1A, edited by A.J. Culyer and J.P. Newhouse, 
pp. 1093-35. Amsterdam: Elsevier. 
 
Dranove D., M. Satterthwaite, and J. Sindelar. 1986. “Preferred Provider Organizations: 
Injecting Price Competition into the Hospital Market.” Inquiry 23 (4): 419-431. 
 
Durkin, E. 2002. “An Organizational Analysis of Psychosocial and Medical Services in 
Outpatient Drug Abuse Treatment Programs.” Social Service Review 76 (3):406-29. 
 
Ettner, S., M. Argeriou, D. McCarty, J. Dilonardo, and H. Liu. 2003. “How Did the Introduction 
of Managed Care for the Uninsured in Iowa Affect the Use of Substance Abuse 
Services?” Journal of Behavioral Health Services and Research 30 (1):26-40 
   26 
Ettner, S., G. Denmead, J. Dilonardo, H. Cao, and A. Belanger. 2003. “The Impact of Managed 
Care on the Substance Abuse Treatment Patterns and Outcomes of Medicaid 
Beneficiaries: Maryland’s HealthChoice Program.” Journal of Behavioral Health 
Services and Research 30 (1):41-62. 
 
Frank, R., and T. McGuire. 1997. “Savings from a Medicaid Carve Out for Mental Health and 
Substance Abuse Services in Massachusetts.” Psychiatry Services  48 (9):1147-52.  
 
Friedmann, P., J. Alexander, and T. D’Aunno. 1999. “Organizational Correlates of Access to 
Primary Care and Mental Health Services in Drug Abuse Treatment Units.” Journal of 
Substance Abuse Treatment 16 (1):71-80. 
 
Friedmann, P., S. Lemon, E. Durkin, and T. D’Aunno. 2003. “Trends in Comprehensive Service 
Availability in Outpatient Drug Abuse Treatment.” Journal of Substance Abuse 
Treatment 24 (1):81-8. 
 
Friedmann, P., S. Lemon, M. Stein, and T. D’Aunno. 2003. “Accessibility of Addiction 
Treatment: Results from a National Survey of Outpatient Substance Abuse Treatment 
Organizations.” Health Services Research 38 (3):887-03. 
 
Glazer, J., and T. McGuire. 2002. “Multiple Payers, Commonality and Free-Riding in Health 
Care: Medicare and Private Payers.” Journal of Health Economics 21 (6):1049-1069. 
 
Gould, F., M. Levine, and A.T. McLellan. 2000. “Treating the Substance-Abusing Patient in the 
Public Sector: ‘Medical Necessity’ Versus ‘Social Necessity and Social Responsibility’ 
in the Philadelphia Target Cities Demonstration Project.” Journal of Substance Abuse 
Treatment 18 (1):75-7. 
 
Gray, B., and W. McNerney. 1986. “For-Profit Enterprise in Health Care.” New England Journal 
of Medicine 314 (23):1523-8. 
 
Greene, W. 2003. Econometric Analysis, 5
th ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall. 
 
Hansmann, H. 1980. “The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise.” Yale Law Journal 89 (5):835-01. 
 
Harwood, H., D. Fountain, and G. Livermore. 1998. The Economic Costs of Alcohol and Drug 
Abuse in the United States, 1992.  Rockville MD: National Institute on Drug Abuse, NIH 
Publication No 98-4327. 
 
Hirth, R. 1999. “Consumer Information and Competition Between Nonprofit and For-profit 
Nursing Homes.” Journal of Health Economics 18 (2):219-40. 
 
Hodgkin, D., D. Shepard, Y. Anthony, and G. Strickler. 2004. “A Publicly Managed Medicaid 
Substance Abuse Carve-Out: Effects on Spending and Utilization.” Administration and 
Policy in Mental Health 31 (3):197-17. 
   27 
Institute of Medicine. 1990. Treating Drug Problems—Volume 1: A Study of the Evolution, 
Effectiveness, and Financing of Public and Private Drug Treatment Systems. Washington 
DC: National Academy Press. 
 
Kapur, K., and B. Weisbrod. 2000.  “The Roles of Government and Nonprofit Suppliers in 
Mixed Industries.”  Public Finance Review 28 (4):275-08. 
 
Kennedy, P. 1998. A Guide to Econometrics, 4
th ed. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
 
Lee, M.T., S. Reif, G.A. Rigger, H.F. Levin, and C.M. Horgan. 2001. “Access to Services in the 
Substance Abuse Treatment System. Variations by Facility Characteristics.” Recent 
Developments in Alcoholism, vol. 15, Services Research in the Era of Managed Care, edited 
by M. Gallanter, pp.137-56. New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum 
 
Lemak, C., and J. Alexander. 2001. “Managed Care and Outpatient Substance Abuse Treatment 
Intensity.” Journal of Behavioral Health Services and Research 28 (1):12-29. 
 
Lemak C., J. Alexander, and T. D’Aunno. 2001. “Selective Contracting in Managed Care: The 
Case of Substance Abuse Treatment.” Medical Care Research and Review 58 (4):455-81. 
 
Lindrooth, R. and B. Weisbrod. 2004. “Do Nonprofit and For-profit Hospices Really Differ?  An 
Analysis of the Hospice Industry.”  Medical University of South Carolina, Center for 
Health Economic and Policy Studies (CHEPS), Working Paper #005-04. 
 
Maddala, G. 1983. Limited-Dependent and Qualitative Variables in Econometrics. New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Marsh, J., T. D’Aunno, and B. Smith. 2000. “Increasing Access and Providing Social Services to 
Improve Drug Abuse Treatment for Women with Children.” Addiction 95 (8):1237-47. 
 
McClellan, M., and J. Newhouse. 2000. “Introduction: Overview of the Special Supplement 
Issue.” In Instrumental Variables Analysis: Applications in Health Services Research: A 
Special Supplement to HSR, edited by M. McClellan and J. Newhouse. Health Services 
Research 35 (5), Part II. 
 
McLellan, A.T., I. Arndt, D. Metzger, G. Woody, and C. O’Brien. 1993. “The Effects of 
Psychosocial Services in Substance-Abuse Treatment.” JAMA 269 (15):1953-9. 
 
McLellan, A.T., T. Hagan, K. Meyers, M. Levine, F. Gould, M. Bencivengo, J. Durell, and J. 
Jaffe. 1998. “Supplemental Social Services Improve Outcomes in Public Addiction 
Treatment.” Addiction 93 (10):1489-99. 
 
McLellan, A.T., M. Levine, T. Hagan, K. Meyers, M. Randall, F. Gould, M. Bencivengo, and J. 
Durell. 1999. “Does Clinical Case Management Improve Outpatient Addiction 
Treatment?” Drug and Alcohol Dependence 55 (1-2):91-03. 
   28 
McNeese-Smith, D.K. 1998. “Program Directors’ Views of the Effect of Managed Care on 
Substance Abuse Programs in Los Angeles County.” Psychiatric Services 49 (10):1323-
9. 
 
Milby, J., J. Schumacher, J. Raczynski, E. Caldwell, M. Engle, M. Michael, and J. Carr. 1996. 
“Sufficient Conditions for Effective Treatment of Substance Abusing Homeless Persons.” 
Drug and Alcohol Dependence 43 (1-2):39-47. 
 
National Consensus Development Panel on Effective Medical Treatment of Opiate Addiction. 
1998. “Effective Medical Treatment of Opiate Addiction.” JAMA 280 (22):1936-43. 
 
National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA), National Institutes of Health, U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services. 1999. Principles of Drug Addition Treatment: A Research 
Based Guide. NIH Publication No. 99-4180. Washington, DC: National Institutes of 
Health. 
 
Newhouse, J. 1970. “Toward a Theory of Nonprofit Institutions: An Economic Model of a 
Hospital.” American Economic Review 60 (1):64-74. 
 
Office of National Drug Control Policy. 1996. “Treatment Protocol Effectiveness Study: A 
White Paper of the Office of National Drug Control Policy.” Journal of Substance Abuse 
Treatment 13 (4):295-20. 
 
Office of National Drug Control Policy. 2001. The Economic Costs of Drug Abuse in the US, 
1992-1998. Publication no. NCJ-190636. Washington DC: Executive Office of the 
President. 
 
Olmstead, T., and J. Sindelar. 2004. “To What Extent Are Key Services Offered in Treatment 
Programs for Special Populations?” Journal of Substance Abuse Treatment 27 (1):9-15. 
 
Olmstead, T., W. White, and J. Sindelar. 2004. “The Impact of Managed Care on Substance 
Abuse Treatment Services.” Health Services Research 39 (2):319-45. 
 
Rivers, J. 1998. “Services for Substance Abusers in a Changing Health Care System.” American 
Behavioral Scientist 41 (8):1136-56. 
 
Rodgers, J., and P. Barnett. 2000. “Two Separate Tracks? A National Multivariate Analysis of 
Differences Between Public and Private Substance Abuse Treatment Programs.” 
American Journal of Drug and Alcohol Abuse 26 (3):429-42. 
 
Rosenau, P., and S. Linder. 2003. “Two Decades of Research Comparing For-Profit and 
Nonprofit Health Provider Performance in the United States.” Social Science Quarterly 
84 (2):219-41. 
 
Smith, B., and J. Marsh. 2002. “Client-Service Matching in Substance Abuse Treatment for 
Women with Children.” Journal of Substance Abuse Treatment 22 (3):161-8.   29 
 
Staiger, D. and J. Stock. 1997. “Instrumental Variables Regression with Weak Instruments.” 
Econometrica 65 (3):557-86. 
 
Steenrod, S., A. Brisson, D. McCarty, and D. Hodgkin. 2001. “Effects of Managed Care on 
Programs and Practices for the Treatment of Alcohol and Drug Dependence.” Recent 
Developments in Alcoholism, vol. 15, Services Research in the Era of Managed Care, 
edited by M. Gallanter, pp.51-71. New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum.  
 
Steinberg, R. 2004. “Economic Theories of Nonprofit Organizations.” Prepared for The 
Nonprofit Sector: A Research Handbook, 2
nd ed., edited by W. Powell and R. Steinberg.   
 
Sturm, R. 2000. “Managed Care Risk Contracts and Substance Abuse Treatment.” Inquiry 37 
(2):219-25. 
 
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Health Resources and Services Administration, 
Bureau of Health Professions, National Center for Health Workforce Analysis. 2002a. Area 
Resource File. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.  
 
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services 
Administration, Office of Applied Studies. 2002b. National Survey of Substance Abuse 
Treatment Services (N-SSATS), 2000: [United States] [Computer file]. ICPSR version. 
Arlington, VA: Synectics for Management Decisions, Inc. [producer].  Ann Arbor, MI: 
Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor]. 
 
Weisbrod, B. 1998. The Nonprofit Economy.  Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University 
Press. 
 
Wheeler, J. and T. Nahra. 2000. “Private and Public Ownership in Outpatient Substance Abuse 
Treatment: Do We Have a Two-Tiered System?” Administration and Policy in Mental 
Health 27 (4):197-09. 
 
   30 
 
Table 1: Summary Statistics of Outcome Variables
1 
 
   
 
Ownership Type 







   
Not for Profit 













  MC = 0 
N = 1,283
 
MC = 1 
N = 1,630
    MC = 0 
N = 2,753 
MC = 1 
N = 3,694
    MC = 0 
N = 645 
MC = 1 
N = 508 
Total Services 
 
Total number of services offered 
at SAT facility 
13.70 





  13.60 
(4.68) 
14.78 





Assessment                       
   Subst abuse assessment 
 
0-1 dummy variable, = 1 if facility  
offers substance abuse assessment 
0.93 





  0.87 
(0.34) 
0.97 





   Mental health assessment 
 
0-1 dummy variable, = 1 if facility 
offers mental health assessment 
0.43 





  0.29 
(0.46) 
0.50 





Therapy/Counseling                       
   Family counseling 
 
0-1 dummy variable, = 1 if facility  
offers family counseling 
0.78 





  0.67 
(0.47) 
0.85 





   Group therapy 
 
0-1 dummy variable, = 1 if facility 
offers group therapy 
0.89 





  0.88 
(0.33) 
0.93 





   Individual therapy 
 
0-1 dummy variable, = 1 if facility  
offers individual therapy 
0.95 





  0.93 
(0.26) 
0.97 





   Pharmaco therapy 
 
0-1 dummy variable, = 1 if facility  
offers pharmaco therapy 
0.41 





  0.27 
(0.45) 
0.51 





   Relapse prevention groups 
 
0-1 dummy variable, = 1 if facility  
offers relapse prevention groups 
0.78 





  0.79 
(0.41) 
0.82 





   Aftercare counseling 
 
0-1 dummy variable, = 1 if facility  
offers aftercare counseling 
0.78 





  0.71 
(0.45) 
0.83 





Medical Testing                       
   Blood alcohol test 
 
0-1 dummy variable, = 1 if facility 
offers blood alcohol testing 
0.45 





  0.38 
(0.49) 
0.50 





   Drug/alcohol urine screen 
 
0-1 dummy variable, = 1 if facility  
offers drug/alcohol urine screening 
0.79 





  0.79 
(0.41) 
0.83 





   Hepatitis 
 
0-1 dummy variable, = 1 if facility  
offers hepatitis testing 
0.24 





  0.21 
(0.41) 
0.27 





   HIV test 
 
0-1 dummy variable, = 1 if facility  
offers HIV testing 
0.32 





  0.35 
(0.48) 
0.36 





   STD test 
 
0-1 dummy variable, = 1 if facility  
offers STD testing 
0.23 





  0.21 
(0.41) 
0.25 





   TB screen 
 
0-1 dummy variable, = 1 if facility  
offers TB screening 
0.36 





  0.36 
(0.48) 
0.39 
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Table 1 (continued): Summary Statistics of Outcome Variables
1   
   
 
Ownership Type 







   
Not for Profit 













  MC = 0 
N = 1,283
 
MC = 1 
N = 1,630
    MC = 0 
N = 2,753 
MC = 1 
N = 3,694
    MC = 0 
N = 645 
MC = 1 
N = 508 
Transitional                       
   Asst obtaining social srvcs 
 
 
0-1 dummy variable, = 1 if facility 























   Discharge planning 
 
0-1 dummy variable, = 1 if facility 
offers discharge planning 
0.82 





  0.82 
(0.39) 
0.87 





   Employment training 
 
0-1 dummy variable, = 1 if facility 
offers employment training 
0.36 





  0.48 
(0.50) 
0.36 





    Housing assistance 
 
0-1 dummy variable, = 1 if facility 
offers housing assistance 
0.30 





  0.40 
(0.49) 
0.34 





   Referral to other trans srvcs 
 
 
0-1 dummy variable, = 1 if facility 























Other services                       
   Case management 
 
0-1 dummy variable, = 1 if facility 
offers case management 
0.66 





  0.71 
(0.46) 
0.71 





   Child care 
 
0-1 dummy variable, = 1 if facility 
offers child care 
0.10 





  0.13 
(0.34) 
0.13 





   Domestic violence 
 
0-1 dummy variable, = 1 if facility 
offers domestic violence 
0.34 





  0.31 
(0.46) 
0.35 





   HIV/AIDS education 
 
0-1 dummy variable, = 1 if facility 
offers HIV/AIDS education 
0.55 





  0.61 
(0.49) 
0.58 





   Outcome follow-up 
 
0-1 dummy variable, = 1 if facility 
offers outcome follow-up 
0.49 





  0.52 
(0.50) 
0.55 





   Transportation assist 
 
0-1 dummy variable, = 1 if facility 
offers transportation assistance 
0.35 





  0.42 
(0.49) 
0.40 





   Acupuncture 
 
0-1 dummy variable, = 1 if facility 
offers acupuncture 
0.05 





  0.06 
(0.23) 
0.06 





1Summary statistics are sample means with standard deviations in parentheses. 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics of Regressors
1 
 













  MC = 0 
N = 1,283 
MC = 1
 
N = 1,630 
  MC = 0 
N = 2,753 
MC = 1 
N = 3,694
    MC = 0 
N = 645 
MC = 1 





0-1 dummy variable, = 1 if facility has 
agreements or contracts with managed 
care organizations to provide substance 


























Focus: substance abuse 
 
 
0-1 dummy variable, = 1 if primary focus of 


























0-1 dummy variable, = 1 if primary focus of 
facility is mental health services 
0.09 













Focus: general health 
 
0-1 dummy variable, = 1 if primary focus of 
facility is general health care 
0.02 













Focus: mental health &  
            substance abuse 
 
0-1 dummy variable, = 1 if focus of facility 
is a mix of mental health and substance 
abuse treatment services 
0.24 
(0.43) 





















0-1 dummy variable, = 1 if primary focus of 
facility is “other” 
0.02 





  0.04 
(0.20) 
0.02 







0-1 dummy variable, = 1 if facility is located 
in, or operated by, a general hospital 
0.10 















0-1 dummy variable, = 1 if facility is located 
in, or operated by, a psychiatric hospital 
0.02 













Hospital: other specialty 
 
 
0-1 dummy variable, = 1 if facility is located 
in, or operated by, an “other” specialty 
hospital (e.g., alcoholism, maternity, etc.) 
0.01 
(0.08) 





















0-1 dummy variable, = 1 if facility is a 
private solo practice 
0.05 
















0-1 dummy variable, = 1 if facility operates 























Any hospital inpatient 
 
 
0-1 dummy variable, = 1 if facility offers 























Any non-hospital residential 
 
 
0-1 dummy variable, = 1 if facility offers 

























0-1 dummy variable, = 1 if facility offers 
outpatient substance abuse services 
0.83 















0-1 dummy variable, = 1 if facility 
dispenses methadone or LAAM  
0.09 
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Table 2 (continued): Summary Statistics of Regressors
1 













  MC = 0 
N = 1,283 
MC = 1
 
N = 1,630 
  MC = 0 
N = 2,753 
MC = 1 
N = 3,694
    MC = 0 
N = 645 
MC = 1 
N = 508 
Accredited 
 
0-1 dummy variable, = 1 if facility is 
accredited by JCAHO or CARF or NCQA 
0.33 













Licensed by state 
 
 
0-1 dummy variable, = 1 if facility is 

























Size of facility, measured by log of annual 
admissions 
4.90 













Accepts cash or self-
payment 
 
0-1 dummy variable, = 1 if facility accepts 























Accepts private health 
insurance 
 
0-1 dummy variable, = 1 if facility accepts 

























0-1 dummy variable, = 1 if facility accepts 
Medicaid for substance abuse treatment 
0.54 















0-1 dummy variable, = 1 if facility accepts 
Medicare for substance abuse treatment 
0.36 













Accepts state-financed  
health insurance 
 
0-1 dummy variable, = 1 if facility accepts 
state-financed health insurance for 
substance abuse treatment 
0.37 
(0.48) 



















Receives public funds (not  
Medicare, Medicaid) 
 
0-1 dummy variable, = 1 if facility receives 
public funds (not Medicare or Medicaid) for 
substance abuse treatment 
0.66 
(0.47) 



















Offers payment assistance 
 
 
0-1 dummy variable, = 1 if facility offers 
payment assistance for clients receiving 
substance abuse treatment 
0.79 
(0.40) 





















0-1 dummy variable, = 1 if facility is located 
within a metropolitan area  
0.77 













Population density –  
county (log) 
Log of the number of people in the county 
per square mile 
6.07 













Population – county (log) 
 
Log of the county population 
 
12.61 













Competition – county  
 
Herfindahl Index in the county 
 
0.26 













Medicare MC enrollees – 
county (log) 
Log of Medicare managed care enrollees 
in the county 
7.84 













HMO enrollees –  
county (log) 
Log of HMO enrollees in the county 
 
10.70 













1Summary statistics are sample means with standard deviations in parentheses.
  




Table 3: Total Services – Structural Equation Results  
 
     
For Profit 
N = 2,913 
  Not for Profit 
N = 6,447 
  Public 
N = 1,153 
Variable Name    Coef
  P_value    Coef
  P_value    Coef  P_value 
Managed care    3.818  0.000    -0.889  0.348    -3.725  0.001 
Focus: substance abuse
†    -0.351  0.666    0.587  0.087    -0.023  0.976 
Focus: mental health
†    -0.976  0.280    0.328  0.391    -0.495  0.577 
Focus: general health
†    0.246  0.830    2.436  0.000    2.801  0.011 
Focus: mental & substance
†    0.173  0.835    1.394  0.000    0.969  0.241 
Hospital: general
‡    1.271  0.019    -0.020  0.946    1.074  0.059 
Hospital: psychiatric
‡     1.729  0.009    0.941  0.022    2.317  0.007 
Hospital: other specialty
‡     -1.535  0.036    1.121  0.044    2.315  0.053 
Solo practice    -0.526  0.013    N/A      N/A   
Halfway house    1.074  0.017    0.063  0.758    0.357  0.511 
Any hospital inpatient    2.450  0.000    2.622  0.000    0.833  0.229 
Any non-hospital residential    3.361  0.000    2.960  0.000    2.240  0.000 
Any outpatient    0.610  0.161    1.034  0.000    0.060  0.911 
Methadone/LAAM dispensed    3.542  0.000    2.277  0.000    1.997  0.000 
Accredited    0.613  0.007    0.705  0.000    0.900  0.014 
Licensed by state    1.123  0.000    0.716  0.002    1.070  0.050 
Admissions (log)     0.346  0.000    0.326  0.000    0.525  0.000 
Accepts cash or self-payment    -0.742  0.296    -0.904  0.000    0.599  0.388 
Accepts private health insurance    -0.525  0.133    0.642  0.099    2.047  0.000 
Accepts Medicaid    0.281  0.239    0.920  0.000    0.600  0.213 
Accepts Medicare    0.251  0.282    0.545  0.002    0.262  0.503 
Accepts state-financed health insurance    0.529  0.011    0.721  0.000    0.784  0.025 
Receives public funds (not Medicare, Medicaid)    0.545  0.013    1.235  0.000    0.971  0.113 
Offers payment assistance    1.108  0.000    0.936  0.000    1.286  0.017 
Metropolitan area    -0.133  0.663    -0.472  0.037    -0.453  0.347 
Population density – county (log)    0.052  0.498    0.239  0.006    0.249  0.119 
Population – county (log)    0.080  0.538    0.149  0.168    0.434  0.112 
Competition – county    0.722  0.199    -0.805  0.033    0.970  0.226 
Constant    4.129  0.030    4.066  0.001    -0.209  0.945 
                   
F-statistic for instruments (statistic, p_value)    10.88  0.004    49.49  0.000    5.35  0.069 
Test of overidentification (statistic, p_value)    1.12  0.289    2.57  0.109    0.23  0.633 
†excluded category is “other”     
‡excluded category is “not a hospital”    
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Table 3A: Total Services – Selection Equation Results  
 
     
For Profit 
N = 2,913 
  Not for Profit 
N = 6,447 
  Public 
N = 1,153 
Variable Name    Coef
  P_value    Coef
  P_value    Coef  P_value 
                   
Medicare MC enrollments (log)    0.049  0.015    0.066  0.000    0.016  0.533 
HMO enrollments (log)    0.024  0.183    0.066  0.000    0.045  0.036 
Focus: substance abuse
†    0.261  0.359    0.052  0.666    -0.034  0.904 
Focus: mental health
†    0.320  0.308    -0.169  0.216    -0.130  0.670 
Focus: general health
†    0.031  0.949    0.115  0.565    0.392  0.369 
Focus: mental & substance
†    0.519  0.082    0.092  0.484    0.010  0.973 
Hospital: general
‡    -0.070  0.754    0.340  0.004    0.432  0.028 
Hospital: psychiatric
‡     -0.023  0.933    0.332  0.048    -0.380  0.176 
Hospital: other specialty
‡     0.332  0.418    0.167  0.560    0.150  0.686 
Solo practice    -0.252  0.001    N/A      N/A   
Halfway house    -0.116  0.507    0.164  0.007    0.077  0.635 
Any hospital inpatient    0.184  0.376    0.303  0.002    0.042  0.842 
Any non-hospital residential    0.114  0.326    -0.024  0.689    -0.028  0.825 
Any outpatient    0.011  0.953    0.233  0.000    0.039  0.796 
Methadone/LAAM dispensed    -0.451  0.000    -0.200  0.037    -0.010  0.947 
Accredited    0.486  0.000    0.287  0.000    -0.032  0.766 
Licensed by state    0.177  0.034    0.284  0.001    0.224  0.221 
Admissions (log)     0.086  0.002    0.106  0.000    0.136  0.000 
Accepts cash or self-payment    0.153  0.551    0.222  0.022    0.058  0.797 
Accepts private health insurance    1.326  0.000    0.915  0.000    0.473  0.002 
Accepts Medicaid    0.395  0.000    0.303  0.000    0.509  0.000 
Accepts Medicare    0.190  0.015    0.135  0.009    -0.060  0.583 
Accepts state-financed health insurance    0.379  0.000    0.278  0.000    0.359  0.000 
Receives public funds (not Medicare, Medicaid)    -0.015  0.847    0.043  0.556    -0.353  0.044 
Offers payment assistance    -0.072  0.248    0.095  0.108    0.152  0.379 
Metropolitan area    -0.304  0.005    -0.052  0.544    -0.106  0.487 
Population density – county (log)    0.056  0.082    -0.015  0.588    0.032  0.573 
Population – county (log)    -0.141  0.041    -0.226  0.000    -0.216  0.034 
Competition – county    -0.440  0.032    -0.197  0.144    -0.228  0.344 
Constant    -0.940  0.210    -0.483  0.267    0.157  0.874 
                   
†excluded category is “other”     
‡excluded category is “not a hospital”    
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Table 4: Effects of Managed Care on Individual Services
† 
 
   
For Profit    Not for Profit    Public 
  Coef
  Marginal*
    Coef
  Marginal*
    Coef  Marginal*
 
                 
Assessment                 





















  0.374 
(0.539) 
0.093 





                 
Therapy/Counseling                 






  -0.197 
(0.378) 
-0.048 











  0.194 
(0.320) 
0.017 











  -0.026 
(0.896) 
-0.001 











  0.217 
(0.617) 
0.056 











  0.490 
(0.084) 
0.140 











  -0.352 
(0.121) 
-0.074 





                 
Medical Testing                 






  0.116 
(0.874) 
0.042 











  0.452 
(0.070) 
0.120 











  -0.381 
(0.259) 
-0.062 











  -0.539 
(0.134) 
-0.182 











  -0.630 
(0.011) 
-0.122 











  -0.611 
(0.063) 
-0.189 
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Table 4 (continued): Effects of Managed Care on Individual Services
† 
 
   
For Profit    Not for Profit    Public 
  Coef
  Marginal*
    Coef
  Marginal*
    Coef  Marginal*
 
                 
Transitional                 






  -0.550 
(0.169) 
-0.217 











  0.722 
(0.013) 
0.219 











  -0.702 
(0.052) 
-0.250 











  -0.441 
(0.189) 
-0.138 











  -0.055 
(0.846) 
-0.015 





                   
Other services                 






  0.249 
(0.502) 
0.093 











  -0.137 
(0.711) 
-0.040 











  -0.054 
(0.886) 
-0.018 











  -0.404 
(0.438) 
-0.153 











  -0.817 
(0.008) 
-0.313 











  0.044 
(0.907) 
0.016 




















Boldface entries are statistically significant (p_value < 0.100). 
* Marginal effects measure the change in the probability that a given service is offered for a discrete change in MC from 0 to 1.  Marginal 
effects are calculated for a typical for-profit SAT facility comprising the following characteristics: primary focus is substance abuse, not 
affiliated with any type of hospital, not a solo practice, not a halfway house, no hospital inpatient services, no non-hospital residential 
services, offers outpatient services, methadone not dispensed, not accredited, licensed by the state, accepts cash or self-payment, accepts 
private insurance, does not accept Medicaid, does not accept Medicare, does not accept state-financed health insurance, does not receive 
public funds (not Medicaid or Medicare), offers payment assistance, and located in a metropolitan area in the Northeast.  Marginal effects are 
calculated for typical not-for-profit and public SAT facilities comprising characteristics identical to for-profits except that they both accept 
Medicaid and receive public funds (not Medicaid or Medicare). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 